RECENT CASES.
AGENCY-CONTRACT FOR SALE OF LAND SIGNED

BY

AGENT FOR UNDISCLOSED

PRINCIPLE.-Plaintiff, the purchaser, brought an action for the specilc per-

formance of an alleged agreement for the conveyance of land owned by the
defendant. The only evidence in writing was a memorandum made and
signed by the defendant and another, as agents for the purchaser without disclosing the latter's name. The decree was refused. Halperin v. Magida,
201 N. Y. S. i8o (1923).
If the statute of frauds is satisfied the contract is enforceable. Jones v.
Barnes, 1o5 App. Div. 287, 94 N. Y. S. 695 (igoS).
A memorandum of a contract for the sale of land must show the parties
on its face. 27 C. J. 276; Gafton v. Cummins, 99 U. S. ioo (1878); Valsh
v. Amringe, io3 N. Y. Misc. 350 (i918). The statute is generally held to be
satisfied in this respect when the agent signs his own name without disclosing either the principal or the fact of the agency, for the reason that the
writing, on its face, does show two people who are bound, and the undisclosed principal may charge or be charged on it. Byrne v. McDonough, i4
N. Y. Misc. 529, 186 N. Y. S. 8o7 (i92); Usher v. Daniels, 73 N. H. 2o6,
6o Atl. 746 (19o5); 27 C. J. 276, 298. However, if the agent discloses the
agency, the statute is not satisfied, according to the weight of authority.
Gafton v. Cummins, mupra; Mertz v. Hubbard, 75 Kans. 1, 88 Pac. 529
(i9o7); 27 C. J. 2- 6 . The rule is otherwise in Massachusetts and Ohio.
Tobin v. Larkin, 183 Mass. 389, 67 N. E. 24o (Igo3); Walsh v. Barton, 24
Ohio St. 28 (1873).
But by merely adding "agent" or similar words after his signature, the
agent does not indicate thereby that he acts only in a representative capacity,
in cases where the principal is undisclosed and where, by a grammatical
and logical construction of the instrument, the agent binds himself. Such
additional words are construed to be merely descriptio personae. See 72 U.
OF PA. L. REv. 5o.
The real test in cases like the one under consideration should be whether
or not the agent signed in such manner as to bind himself as a party. The
test is thus frequently stated. 27 C. J. 26; 25 R. C. L. 658. But in deciding the cases courts pay no attention to the rules determining whether or not
the agent is himself bound and make the disclosure or non-disclosure of the
agency the real basis of their decisions. Gafton v. Cummins, supra; Mentz
v. Newwitter, z22 N. Y. 491 (i8go). In the principal case whether or not
the agent was bound does not clearly appear. No effort was made to answer this question; and the court rests its decision, it is submitted, without
good reason on the fact alone that the agent disclosed the agency without
disclosing the principal
AGENcY-RATIFICATrON-RECEIviNG BENEFITS IN IGNORANCE OF UNAUTHOR-

PRovisioNs.-Defendant's agent, with powers limited to the sale of
stock, sold and delivered stock to the plaintiff under an unauthorized agreement to repurchase same at the end of three years at a premium. Defendant received proceeds of the sale without knowledge of the agreement to
repurchase, and, when told of the agreement three years later, promptly
IZED
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repudiated it. Plaintiff claims the subsequent retention of the benefits of the
sale, after knowledge of the agreement, amounts to ratification. Held:
Judgment for the defendant. Murray v. Standard Pccan Co., 140 N. E. 834
(Ii., 1923).
The general rule-is that receipt of the benefits of an unauthorized contract will not amount to ratification if done in ignorance of material facts;
Combs v. Scott et al., 12 Allen 493 (Mass., 1866); although the principal
will be charged with notice when he knows irregularities have occurred and
receives the fruits of the contract without inquiry, Niemeyer Lumber Co. v.
Moore, 55 Ark. 240 (igi) ; or, where the facts are so obvious that the principal, as a reasonable man, cannot say he was ignorant of them. Scott v.
Middleton Railroad Co., 86 N. Y. 2oo (1881); Swisher v. Palmer, io6 Ill.
432 (1902).
After knowledge of all material facts, the principal can either affirm
or repudiate the unauthorized contract. If he would effectually do the
latter, he must restore to the other party the benefits he has received, within
a reasonable time after knowledge. Koch v. Oil City, 47 Pa. Super. 2
(I9I) : National Bank of Los Vegos v. Oberne, 121 Ill. 25 (1886). Otherwise, he will be taken to have ratified the contract. Mechem Agency (2d
ed.), Vol. I, sec. 436.
This generalization, however, is subject to several exceptions. One is
where the principal, before knowledge, has put it beyond his power to restore the benefit received, as where it has been disposed of. Thacher v.
Pray, 113 Mass. 291 (1873); Baldwin v. Burrows, 47 N. Y. i99 (1872) ; or
cannot be identified, Thrall v. Wilson, 17 Pa. Super. 376 (goi); or where
such return cannot be made without substantial injury, Forman & Co. v.
The Liddesdale, [i9oo] .App. Cas. i9o (Eng.) ; Cooley v. Perrine, 41 N. 3. L
322 (1879); Bryant v. Moore, 26 Me. 84 (1846).
Another exception, and the one illustrated by the principal case, is where
the agent, in making a contract on behalf of his principal, adds thereto
stipulations which he was not authorized to make, such stipulations not
being essential or customary elements of the particular contract. John Gund
Brewing Co. v. Tourtellotte, io8 Minn. 71, 121 N. W. 417 (1o9); 21 R. C.
L 929 sec. 1o8. Also see note to the Minnesota case in 29 U. R. A.
(N. S.) 210.
In such event, retention of the benefits of the contract, after knowledge
of the unauthorized, collateral stipulations, will not be an affirmation of the
latter. Daly v. Iselin, 218 Pa. 515. 67 AtI. 837 (1907); Smith v. Tracy, 36
N. Y. 79 (1867); Bierman v. City Mills Co., 15t N. Y. 482 (1897). The
principal, by retaining the proceeds, adopts and ratifies only what he had
authorized, Wheeler v. Northwestern Sleigh Co., 39 Fed. 347 (889); and
the third party must suffer for having dealt with a special agent without
ascertaining the extent of his authority. Davenport Savings Fund & Loan
Asso. v. The North American Fire Insurance Co., 16 Iowa 74 (i864).
To hold otherwise, would be to ignore the doctrine that an agent can
bind his principal only within the. scope of his authority. Roberts v. Rumley, 58 Iowa 3o (z882).
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AL1ENS-IMMIGRATIO,-RIGHT OF WIFE TO ENr.--An alien Turkish
merchant, who had resided in the United States eight years and had declared his intentioi to become a citizen, returned to his native land on a
temporary visit in order to get married and, several months later, returned
with his wife. The Turkish quota had been filled and admission was refused
the wife. Held: She was entitled to enter. U. S. cx rcl. Markarian v. Tod,
290 Fed. z98 (C. C. A. x923).
The Immigration Act of February 5, 1917, 39 Stat. at L 874, excepts
from exclusion (among other classes) merchants and "their legal wives and
their children under i6 years who shall accompany them." The Quota Act
of May i9,1921. 42 Stat. at L. 5, which is expressly "in addition to and not
in substitution for the provisions of the immigration laws," limits the admissible aliens to 3 per cent. of the number of foreign born persons of such
nationality resident in the United States, but excepts from exclusion aliens
returning from a temporary visit abroad.
These two statutes are clearly in pari natcria and, as such, must be construed together as if parts of the same statute. Board of Commissioners v.
Aetna Life Ins. Co., go Fed. = (1898); Peoples Dep. Co. v. Ehrhart, 34
Pa. Sup. 16 (i9ol); Hemmer v. U. S., 2o4 Fed. 898 (1912); especially since
the expression in the later act clearly shows an intent that it adds to and
not replaces the former. State v. Given, 48 Fla. 165, 37 So. 308 (1-904).
Absurd and unreasonable constructions (such as the admission of a husband
and the exclusion of his wife) are to be avoided. Lau Ow Bew v. U. S., 144
U. S. 47 (189i); and no part of a previously existing statute is to be
inoperative unless no other construction is reasonable. U. S. v. Munday,
222 U. S. 175

(x91).

With these well-settled principles firmly in mind, the court construed
(and, it would seem, correctly construed) the two acts as not reasonably recuiring the exclusion attempted-thereby affirming the very similar case of
U. S. ex rel. Gottlieb v. Commissioner of Immigration of New York, 285
Fed. 295 0922). The wife was clearly admissible under the earlier act and
nothing in the later statute militated against her rights.
ATIOmoBI.E-THIIHWAY R u.LATI0--Cvm TzAnmrr,.-An English statute on highway regulations provides that "the motor car . . . shall be in
such a condition as not to cause, or to be likely to cause, danger to any person . . . on any highway." Breach of this provision is punishable by fine.
(Locomotives on Highway Act (i896), See. 6, sub-s. x, and Sec. 7; Motor
Cars (Uses and Construction) Order (19o4), art. IT,reg. 6). While defendants motor lorry was being driven on the public highway, a wheel came off
and damaged plaintiff's van. Defendant was not negligent, having received the
car back from a reputable repair shop only two days before the accident.
Held: No recovery. Phillips v. BrittanniaHygienic Laundry Co, Ltd., L. PL
[1923], 1 Y. B. 539 (Eng.).
When a statute imposes a duty where none existed before, a puntiive
remedy provided by the statute is generally held exclusive; Saunders v. Holborn District Board of Works, L R. [18951. r Q. B. 6D4 (Eng.); Mack v.
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Wright, TSo Pa. 472, 36 Atl. 85 (T897) ; but when the duty is plainly for the
benefit of individuals, and the penalty is inadequate to compel performance
of the duty, it is held that the legislature intends to create a private right
of action as well. Groves v. Lord Wimborne, L. R [i89S], 2 Q. B. 4oz
(Eng.) ; Danner v. Wells, 248 Pa. io5, 93 Atl. 871 (1915). On this principle
the decision of the instant case seems open to question in holding the statute
to be simply a police measure. Here the statute is passed to save from
danger "any person . . . on any highway," and creates an absolute
duty, resting on the owner, that his car be in good condition. This duty,
and consequent absolute liability, might be intended to stimulate the owner
to the highest degree of care, in which case the purpose is public and no
civil liability would arise, or it might be intended to shift the loss, arising
from an accident where there is no negligence, from the casual passerby to
the owner of the car, on the ground that he who enjoys the use of the car
should bear any loss incident to its operation. It is submitted that ordinary
tort principles afford ample protection from negligence; cf. E. R. Thayer,
29 HARv. L. RLv. 8o5. Admitting this, the statute is of no benefit to the
travelling public unless an absolute civil liability is created thereby. But
considering the purview of the statute, the inclusion of this section in an
act with traffic regulations of a police character tends to.show that this section is of a like character. In any case, there should be no recovery in the
instant case, since damage to property could not be breach of a duty not
to endanger persons. Gorris v. Scott, L. R. 9 Exch. 125 (Eng., 1874).
The court also denied recovery on common law principles. Two possible grounds for an opposite ruling suggest themselves, the rule in Rylands
v. Fletcher, and liability for the work of an independent contractor (the
repairer), because of the risk of injury to others. While the extent of
Rylands v. Fletcher is difficult of definition; Charing Cross Electricity Supply Co. v. London Hydraulic Power Co., L. R. [1914], 3 K. B. 77"2 (Eng.);
the case is not generally held to apply to other persons than those having
some interest in land; Clark & Lindsell, Torts (7th ed., 1923) 427; or to
other substances than those which have an inherent tendency to break forth
and do damage; Clark & Lindsell, Torts,'supra. Granting an extension to
movable personal property, the condition of an automobile might well be
such as to bring it within the latter restriction; Hutchins v. Maunder, 37
Law Times R. 72 (Eng., i92o); Lewis v. Amorous, 3 Ga. App. 5o, 59 S..E.
338 (i9o7); 34 H av. L. Ray. 564; but the present case affords no such
instance. Liability for the work of an independent contractor is confined
to work which will be dangerous unless preventive measures are adopted;
Holliday v. National- Telephone Co., L R. 118991, 2 Q. B. 392 (Eng.);
Thompson v. Lowell Ry. Co., i7o Mass. 577, 49 N. E. 913 (iS98); Bohlen,
59 U. oF P. L. Ru'. 448; so that defendant does not answer for the repairer's
negligence in the principal case.
BANKS AND BANKiNG-INsoLVENCY-FRAUULENT RECEIPT OF DEPOSITS.On June 3o, plaintiff made a deposit in the X bank which for some time
had been experiencing a steady loss. of profits and withdrawal of deposits.
The bank had increasing difficulty in providing funds to meet the with-
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drawals since most of their assets consisted of slow paper. About two weeks
before, certain banks in the city evolved a plan whereby the X bank was to
be consolidated with three others and continue business in that way. If the
plan failed, the bank would have to close. There was every expectation of
success until ii o'clock P. If. of above date, when the plan failed and the
bank was turned over to the defendant, supervisor of banking, for liquidation. Plaintiff seeks to recover the deposit on grounds of fraud. Held (two
dissents) : Judgment for the defendant Washington Shoe Mfg. Co. v. Duke,
218 Pac. 232 (Vash.,

1923).

Generally, receipt of deposits by a bank which is hopelessly insolvent to
the knowledge of its officers constitutes fraud and the depositor can recover
back his money. St. Louis & San Francisco Ry. Co. v. Johnston, 133 U. S.
566 (i&o) ; Corn Exchange Nat. Bk. v. Solicitors Loan and Trust Co., i88
Pa. 330, 41 At. 536 (i898); Pennington v. Third Nat. Bank, 114 Va. 674,
114 S. E. 771 (1913)

(cases where the insolvency was beyond dispute).

By

continuing business, the bank is held impliedly to assert a condition of solvency and hence to defraud the depositor. Cragie v. Hadley, 99 N. Y. 13t,
i N. E. 537 (1885); N. Y. Breweries Co. v. Higgins, 79 Hun 250, 29 N. -Y.
S. 416 (1894); Wasson v. Hawkins, 59 Fed. 233 (1894). However, if there
is no kn6wledge of the bank's condition by the officers, there is no fraud.
Balbach v. Frehinghuysen, i5 Fed. 675 (1883); Williams v. Cox, 97 Tenn.
555, 37 S. W'. 282 (1896).
In Illinois, receipt by the bank within thirty days of failure, suspension,
or involuntary liquidation has by statute been declared prima fade evidence
of fraud. Lanterman v. Travous, 174 Ill. 459, 51 N. E. 8o5 (1898) ; see also
it re Silver, 208 Fed. 797 (1912). In Georgia, a peculiar (and, it -would
seem, unreasonable) duty of inquiry is put on the depositor. McGregor v.
Battle, 128 Ga. 577, 58 S. E. 28 (igo7).
As to just when a bank is hopelessly insolvent, there have been few
decisions. It is generally held that a bank may be embarrassed and even
actually insolvent, yet there is reasonable hope, expectation and intention on
the part of the officers to carry on the business and recover sound financial
footing, there is no fraud in accepting deposits. Williams v. Van Norden
Trust Co., 1o4 App. Div. 25!, 93 N. Y. S. 821 (Igo5); Brennan v. Tillinghast, 2oi Fed. 6o9 (1913); Steele v. Allen, 24o Mass. 394, 134 N. E. 40!
(1922).
(In all these cases the banks had been running in uncertain and
shaky condition for some years but were able to continue business and
meet obligations with no anticipation of immediate failure.) Where it was
reasonably believed that a number of- friends of an insolvent debtor who
owed the bank a large amount, would take over his olligations, no fraud
was committed. Quin v. Earle, 95 Fed. 728 (1899). But see Rochester
Printing Co. v. Loomis, 12o N. Y. 659, 24 N. E. m103 (i887), where a similar
expectation was of no avail, as not based on any legal duty to carry the debt.
The dissents are based on a distinction between carrying on business
with the hope of recovering out of the assets, and hopeless insolvency with
the hope of importing new capital and so continuing" in a new and solvent
business. Since the basis of the recovery is fraud, it seems that the principal
case was correctly decided and that the reasoning of the dissent is faulty.
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There was an honest and reasonable expectation of continuing the business
(whether by realizing and recovering from the assets themselves or by new
capital seems immaterial) and hence the necessary fraudulent intent is
lacking.
BILLs

AND NOTES-CERTAINTY-INCREASE

OF

INTEREST

FOR NONPAYMENT

defendant executed a promissory note stipulating that,
if the note was not paid at maturity, the promissor should pay an increased
rate of interest. Held: This provision did not make the note uncertain.
Goehard f at. v. Folsod e at., 195 N. IV. 281 (Minn. 1923).
Decisions as to whether the rule, that a negotiable note must be certain
in amount, is violated by such a provision for increased interest, are various
and conflicting. By the great weight of authority such stipulations are held
to be valid and the instrument negotiable. Towne v. Rice, r22 Mass. 67
(1877); De Haas v. Roberts, 70 Fed. 227, 17 C. C. A. 79 (1895); Merville
v. Harley, 6 S. D. 592, 62 N. W. 958 (1895). Another class of cases maintain the negotiability of the instrument but regard the stipulation as a penalty and void. Smith v. Crane, 33 Minn. 144, 22 N. W. 633 (i885); Kendall v. Selby, 66 Neb. 6o, 92 N. W. 178 (19oo). Still others hold that the
stipulation destroys the negotiability by making the note uncertain. Lamb v.
Story, 45 Mich. 488, 8 N. NV. 18 (1881); Davis v. Brody, 17 S. D. Si, 97
N. W. 719 (1903).
It would seem that it should make no difference whether the higher rate
is to be paid from the date of execution or from maturity, except in determining the amount due at any time after maturity. It has been held that a
stipulation to pay an increased rate from date does not destroy the negotiability. Clark v. Skeen, 6t Kans. 526, 6o Pac. 327 (igoo); Hope v. Barker,
112 Mo. 338, 2o S. V. 567; Crump v. Berdan, 91 Mich. 293, 56 N. W. 559
(1894). The opposite view prevails in a few jurisdictions. .Lamb v. Story,
(suPra) ; Davis v. Brady (jupra).
Section 2, paragraph I of the N. I. L. provides that "the sum payable.
is a sum certain within the meaning of this act although it is to be paid with
interest." This provision was held in Union Bank v. Mayfield, 174 Pac. 1o34
(Okla. 1918), not to destroy the negotiability or validity of a note similar
to that in the instant case; and that decision has been followed in Fox v.
Crane, 43 Cal. 859, 185 Pac. 415 (1919); Sharpe v. Schoenberger, 44 S. D.
4o2, 184 N. W. 209 (1921). It is submitted that such instruments should be
upheld as negotiable. At any time before maturity the amount is readily
determinable from the face of the instrument. At maturity, negotiable paper
ceases to be currency and a stipulation to pay more after an instrument
ceases to be current should not affect its negotiability during currency.
Daniel, Negotiable Instruments (5th ed.) So. And if the stipulation is to
be regarded as a penalty and therefore void, it is surplusage and should not
affect the negotiability.
AT MATURITY.-The

COPYRIGHTn-RADIO

BROADCASTING

OF

COPYRIGHTED

SONC-PERFORMANCE

FOR PRoFiT.-The defendant company, a department store selling radio equip-.
ment, maintained a licensed station from which it broadcasted concerts and
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other entertainment. At the beginning and end of every program, it was accustomed to announce its slogan, which appeared in all its printed advertisements: "L Bamberger, One of America's Great Stores, Newark, N. J."
In the course of one program it broadcasted a song of which the plaintiff
owned the copyright. The plaintiff claimed this constituted a performance
publicly for profit, and prayed for a preliminary injunction restraining further broadcasting. The injunction was granted. M. Wfitmark & Soils v. L.
Banbergcr & Co., 291 Fed. 776 (D. C., 1923).
The Copyright Act of igog provides that the owner of the copyright of
a musical composition shall have the exclusive right to perform the work
publicly for profit. Act of March 4, 1909, c. 320, sec. i (e), 35 Stat. xo75.
It seems unquestioned that the broadcasting of the plaintiff's song was a
performance, and was public. The sole problem to which the court directed
its attention was whether or not it was done for profit. On this point there
are but few decisions, inasmuch as between 1897 and i9og the owner of the
copyright of a musical composition could recover damages for any performance of the work to which he did not consent, Act of Jan. 6, 1897, c. 4,
29 Stat. 481, while prior to 1897 he did not have the exclusive right of
performance and hence could bring no action. See Act of July 8, 1876, c.
23o, sec. ioi, 16 Stat. 214.
The first case a court was called upon to decide was where the plaintiff's copyrighted musical composition was played by an orchestra in the
dining-room of the defendants' hotel. The Circuit Court of Appeals held
that this was not an infringement of the copyright, since Congress meant by
the words "for profit" a direct pecuniary charge, such as an admission fee.
John Church Co. v. Hilliard Hotel Co. et al., 221 Fed. 229, 136 C. C. A. 639
(i915).
This interpretation of the Act was followed where the plaintiffs
sought an injunction to prevent their copyrighted song from being sung by
a paid performer in the defendant's cabaret. Herbert et al. v. Shanley Co.,
2= Fed. 344 (D. C., i9g5); affirmed 229 Fed. 34o, 143 C. C. A. 415o (1916).
But when these cases were carried to the Supreme Court, the decisions below
-were reversed, the court holding that the Act included indirct, as well -as
direct, profit. In the words of Justice Holmes: "If the music did not pay,
it would be given up. If it pays, it pays out of the public's pocket Whether
it pays or not, the purpose of employing it is profit, and that-is enough."
Herbert v. The Shanley Co.; John Church Co. v. Hilliard Hotel Co. et al.,
242 U. S.591, 595 (917).
It has been held in England that the performance
of a musical composition by a hotel orchestra was not a gratuitous public
entertainment, because it was a means of attracting customers, and thus of
gaining a profit. Sarpy v. Holland and Savage, L R. [igo], 2 Ch. Div. z9g,
99 Law Times R. 317 (Eng.). A recent decision holds that it is an infringement to play a copyrighted musical composition in a moving picture
theatre. Harms et al. v. Cohen, 279 Fed. 2f6 (D. C., 19n).
It is submitted that the decision in the principal case is correct. Broadcasting furthers the sale of radio equipment, and thus stimulates the defendant's business. Moreover, the defendant derives great advantage from
the advertising it receives through its name and slogan being constantly
brought to the attention of a large number of people. Indirectly it secures a
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profit from the broadcasting of the plaintiff's song. That is sufficient to
constitute an infringement of the copyright.
COURTS-RESTRAINT

OF

PROCEEDINGS

IN

STATE

COURTS

BY

FEDERAL

CoURTs.-The United States had a lien on crops for payment of rent. Certain persons acquired labor liens on the crops, and in foreclosure proceedings
by them in a state court, a receiver was appointed to sell the crops. To
protect the Government's lien, a Federal court enjoined the receiver from
paying out the proceeds of the sale until further orders from it, the Federal
court. A motion to dissolve the injunction as violating section 265 of the
judicial code was denied. U. S. v. Inaba et al, 271 Fed. 416 (D. C.A 1923).
The Federal judicial code provides that "The writ of injunction shall
not be granted by any court of the United States to stay proceedings in any
court of a state, except where such injunction may be authorized by any
law relating to proceedings in bankruptcy." 36 Stat. at L 1162, c. 231, sec.
265. This, and provisions like it, except as relating to bankruptcy, have
been in force since 1793. 1 Stat. at L.. 333, c. 22, sec. 5; U. S. Rev. Stat.,
sec. 720.

The courts have held, however, that certain types of cases are not
within the scope of this provision, and in such cases injunctions may issue.
Madisonville Traction Co. v. Mining Co., 196 U. S. 239 (19o5); Simon v.
Southern Ry. Co., 236 U. S. 115 (1915).

On the whole subject, see 36 HARV.

L. REv. 461. The present case was not within any of the recognized exceptions, and the injunction was sustained solely because the United States was
a party. The reasoning of the opinion is that the United States could not
have intervened in the state court, as that would have been compelling the
sovereign to subject itself to the jurisdiction of a state, and that consequently the injunction was necessary to protect the lien. If this reasoning
is correct, the case would seem properly to have been held outside the
statute. But a consideration of the opinion raises two questions. Would
such intervention constitute the subjection of sovereignty which the law
interdicts? And would such intervention be a result of compulsion?
The court fails to distinguish between making the United States a defendant and making it a plaintiff in a state court. The former cannot be
done without Congressional consent, which has never been given; Stanley v.
Schwalby, 162 U. S. i55 (1896); but the latter has been done frequently,
U. S. v. Dodge, 14 Johns. 94 (N. Y., 1817); U. S. v. White, 2 Hill 59
and was
(N. Y., 1841); U. S. v. Burrill, io7 Me. 382, 78 Aft. 568 (1ioO);
approved by a Federal court, Steams v. U. S., 2 Paine 3oo (C. C., 1835).
In the principal case the United States would have interiened as a plaintiff.
As to compulsion, the necessity which makes a claimant enter a tribunal to
assert his claim seems scarcely such compulsion as would generally be considered subversive of sovereignty.
There is, in addition to all this, one precedent against the decision in
the principal case. On almost parallel facts a Federal district court decreed the discharge of an attachment obtained by the United States unless
the United States should interplead in the state court, which it accordingly
did. See Johnston v. Stimmel, 26 Hun 435 (N. Y., 1882).
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COVENANTS-BUILDING

REsTRicTIoNS-INTERPRETATION.----The

plaintiff and

defendant purchased adjoining lots. The deeds contained clauses forbidding
the erection of "any slaughter-house, piggery smithshop, forge, furnace,
foundry, or any other factory of any kind whatsoever, or any brewery, distillery or any other noxious or dangerous trade or business, . . . any
stores or garages." The plaintiff sougit to enjoin the defendant from erecting a garage for his private use. The injunction was denied. Gibson ct at.
vi1Main, 1a2 Atl. i88 (Del., 1923).
It is a general rule that any reasonable or substantial doubt regarding the meaning of building restrictions will be resolved against the grantor
and in favor of the free and unrestricted use of the property. Johnson v.
Jones, 244 Pa. 386, 9o At. 649 (i914); Conrad v. Boogher, 2ot Mo. App.
644, 214 S. W. 211 (I919). The rules for interpreting such covenants follow
in brief. The court must determine the intention of the parties by reading,
not a single clause of the deed, but the entire context and, where the meaning is doubtful, by considering the attending circumstances. Hutchinson v;
Ulrich, 145 Ill. 33 6 , 34 N. E. 556 (1893) ; Kitching v. Brown, i8o N. Y. 414,
73 N. E. 241 (i9o5); the deed must be considered with reference to the
situation of the property affected and its present and prospective use. Kenwood Land Co. v. Hancock Invest. Co., 169 Mo. App'. 715, 155 S. W. 861
(1913); regard must be had to the object which the covenant was designed
to accomplish, and the language used must be read in an ordinary or popular,
and not in a legal or technical, sense; Elterich v. Leech R. E. Co., i3o Va.
224, 107 S. E. 785 (i92i); the purpose to be achieved by the covenant must
be kept in mind;. Godfrey v. Hampton, 148 Mo. App. 157, 127 S. W. 626
(1io) ; though restrictions are in general disfavor, the courts must give
effect to the intention of the parties in good faith, and not seek by ingenious
subtleties to evade the restrictions; Sanders v. Dixon, 114 Mo. App..229 89
S. W. 577 (19o5) ; particular words are to be given their common meaning
at the time the covenant was extended. White v. Collins Co., 82 N. Y. App.
Div. 1, 81 N. Y. S. 434 (1903). If, after the application of the above tests,
the court is still in doubt, the general rule invariably applies.
In the principal case the court found that the restrictions applied only
to such structures as are identified with trade or business or some quasipublic use. The instant case is simply another illustration of the tendency
of courts to favor the free and unrestricted use of real property. St. Andrew's Church's Appeal, 67 Pa. 512 (1871).
EQUiTY PRACTICE-MONEY DAMAGES ALoNF_-A bill was brought for
rescission of a contract to exchange land, on the ground of fraud. Rescission was refused because of laches of plaintiff and the case transferred to
the law side of the court to determine plaintiffs damages. Defendant desired a final settlement of the case in the equity proceeding and now applies for a writ of mandamus to compel the judge to set aside the order of
transfer. The writ was refused. Hoontz v. Houghton, x94 N. W. oi8
(Mich., 1923).
There is a clear rule of practice that, if a court of equity has juris-

194

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

diction of a case for the purpose of granting an equitable remedy, it may
retain the case to settle all disputes relating to the subject matter, and in so
doing give such relief as is ordinarily given only by a court of law. McKevitt
v. City of Sacramento, 55 Cal. App. 117, 203 Pac. i32 (192); Blankenhom
v. Edgar, 93 Iowa 184, x86 N. W. 893 (1922); Bosworth v. Johnson, iig
Atl. 753 (R. I., 1923).
But it seems also to be well settled law that, if the right to an equitable
remedy is not established, the court will not retain the case to grant a purely
legal remedy. Kramer v. Cohen, 119 U. S. 355 (1886); Caldwell v. East
Broad Top R. R., 169 Pa. 99, 32 At. 85 (i8gs); Merry Realty Co. v. Shamokin Realty Co., 230 N. Y. 316, z3o N. E. 3o6 (igpi). See also 21 C. J.
x42, 1o R. C. L., sec. i20, and note in ig L. R. A. (N. S.) o65 et seq.
Yet there are cases where the equitable remedy sought has been refused
and damages awarded, some of which are, it is submitted, sound. In these
cases the plaintiff has established his equity, but his recovery is prevented by
the superior rights of an innocent third party, Case v. Minot, 158 Mass. 577,
33 N. E. 700 (1893), or of the general public, Lane v. Michigan Transit Co.,
135 Mich. 70, 97 N. W. 354 (193); Sadlier v. City of New York, 185 N. Y.
4o8, 78 N. E. 272 (19o6), or by developments subsequent to the commencement of the action making the relief sought impossible or unjust Lefevre
v. Chamberlain, 228 Mass. 294, 117 N. E. 327 (1917); Lafean v. American
Caramel Co., 271 Pa. 276, 114 AtL. 622 (iga').
There is, however, much loose language on the subject, and the decisions allowing damages seldom indicate that there are situations in which
damages will not be granted. In addition to the cases which are flatly contra
to the principal case, Downs v. Bristol, 4r Conn. 274 (1874) ; Evans v. Kelley,
49 W. Va. IS8, 38 S. Z 497 (i9o); Andrus v. Berkshire Power Co., 147
Fed. 76, 77 C. C. A. 248 (Igo6), there are others which seek some distinction to uphold them, usually that of the good faith of -the complainant in
bringing his action in equity rather than in law, Johnston v. Bunn, xo8 Va.
490, 62 S. E. 34x (igo8); McLennan v. Church, 163 Wis. 4xx, ij8 N. W. 73
(9gi6). . How such a fact can give a court jurisdiction where none existed
before is not quite clear. See note in ig L. R. A. (N. S.) .zo65 et seq.; but
these cases are comparatively few. The weight of authority is in support of
the principal case and is decisive that, except in special cases where the
plaintiff has established his rights in equity, no legal remedy may be granted
in equity unless supplementary to the equitable remedy.
HUSBAND AND WIfE-TENANTS BY ENTraRM-JUDGMNTS AS Lmxs Upox
LAND.-Title to certain premises in Pennsylvania was vested in A and B,
husband and wife, as tenants by entirety. The defendants obtained two
judgments, one against A and one against B. Thereafter A and B conveyed
to the plaintiff. The defendants attempted to issue ex.ecution, and to sell
the premises as the property of A and B. The plaintiff asked an injunction,
on the ground that this was an unjustified use of the processes of the court to
cast a cloud upon her title. -Held: Under the law of Pennsylvania, injunction
granted. Getty v. A. Hupfers Sons, 292 Fed. 178 (D. C., 1923).
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The for~m of estate known as tenancy by entirety, whereby husband
and wife hold land as a single person, with the right of survivorship, has
continued down to the present day in a number of jurisdictions. See list of
states in 3o L R. A. 314; 30 C. J. 557. At common law, since the husband
had the use and dispositidn of his wife's property, an estate by entirety was
subject to the payment of his debts, provided the wife's right of survivorship was protected. Barber v. Harris, i5 Wend. 61S (N. Y., 1836); Den v.
Gardner, 2o N. J. L 556 (1846) ; Bennett v. Child, i9 Wis. 362 (1865). Since
the passage of the Married Women's Property Acts, decisions on this point
have been conflicting. It has been held that judgment creditors of one
spouse have a lien on a half interest of the estate, and may become tenants
in common of the other spouse. Buttlar v. Rosenblath, 42 N. J. Eq. 651, 9
At. 695 (1887) ; Hiles v. Fisher, 744 N. Y. 3o6, 39 N. E. 337 (1895).; Zubler
v. Porter, 12o AtI. 194 (N. J. Eq., 1923). But what seems the logical view,
and that which is supported by the weight of authority, is that a judgment
against either the husband or the wife is not a lien on the estate which the
two hold together, Otto F. Stofel's Union Brewing Co. v. Saxy, 273 Mo.
i5, 2oi S. ,V. 67 (1917), annotated in L. R. A. 19i8C ioog; Hurd v. Hughes,
io9 At. 418 (Del., i92o) ; Gorelick v. Shapiro, 192 N. NV. 54o (Mich., 1923),
and that they may join and convey a clear title to a purchaser. Jordan v.
Reynolds, io5 Md. ,88, 66 At. 27 (90o7), annotated in 9 L. R. A. (N. S.)
io26 and 12 Ann. Cas. 53. Pennsylvania holds that a judgment against the
husband is a lien against his expectancy of survivorshipr, which will become
enforceable if his wife dies before him. Fleck v. Zillhaver, iix Pa. 519, 12
Atl. 42o (1887). The lien may be divested by the predecease of the husband,
or by a joint alienation of the estate by sale, Beihl v. Martin, 236 Pa. 519,
84 At. 953 (1912), annotated in 42 L. R. A. (N. S.) 5s5, although not by
mortgage. Fleck v. Zillhaver, supra. The logic of the position of the Pennsylvania courts has been criticised. Shapiro, "Estates by Entirety Beihl v.
Martin," 61 U. oF P.,. L Rav. 476. It seems undisputed that a joint judgment against husband and wife will be a lien on the estate. Union National
Bank of Muncie v. Finley, i8o Ind. 470, io3 N. E. 410 (1913);.Ades v.
Caplan, 132 Md. 66, i03 Atl. 94 (i9i8).
It is submitted that the decision in the principal case is correct. There
were two several judgments, not a joint one. Therefore, under the case of
Behil v. Martin, suprao, the court was bound to decide that the plaintiff had
received a clear title. The defendants had no lien on the land, and the court
was justified in restraining them from attempting to assert one. It is further submitted, however, that the hardship worked on the creditor in those
cases which adhere to the majority view is a strong argument for the aloli-"
tion by the legislature of this archaic form of estate.

INFANTS-CONTRAcTS-RIGHT

OF RESTITUTION AFTER

DISAFFIRMANcm.-

The plaintiff, an infant, purchased stock in the defendant company and paid
.part of the purchase price. The shares were registered in her name. The
plaintiff never applied for the certificates, but rescinded the contract and
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sued to recover the cash paid. Held: Judgment for the defendant. Steinberg
v. Scala (Leeds), Ltd., i29 Law Times R. 624 (Eng., 1923).
It is a general rule that an infant may disafrm a contract made by
him for the purchase of property other than necessaries, and may recover
the consideration from which he parted. Ruchizkey v. De Haven, 97 Pa. 2o2
(i881); Hamilton v. Vaughan-Sherrin E. H. Co., 3 Ch. 589 (Eng., 1894);
398, 89 N. E. 796 (i9o9). There is much
Wuller v. Chuse Geo. Co., 241 Ill.
conflict as to whether the infant must return or tender the consideration received by him as a condition precedent to his right of restitution. Probably
the majority of American cases lay down the rule that an infant can in all
cases disaffirm and recover the consideration given by him without first returning what he received, Ruchizkey v. De Haven, supra, but contra, Lemmon v. Beeman, 45 Ohio 3o5, I5N. E. 476 (1888), although the vendor is at
once entitled to retake it in an appropriate action. Carpenter v. Carpenter,
45 Ind. 142 (1873). If the infant has parted with the property or consideration the law is settled that his right to recover is not thereby lost, Ruchizkey
v. De Haven, sura; Morse v. Ely, 154 Mass. 458, 28 N. E. 577 (i89i); MacGeal v. Taylor, 67 U. S. 688 (1897). When under a fair contract he has
received benefits which cannot be returned, a few courts deny him a recovery of the consideration given. Johnson v. Northwestern, etc., Ins. Co., 56
Minn. 365, 57 N. W. 934 (i894); Rice v. Butler, i6o N. Y. 578, 55 N. E.
275 (1899). No doubt most of the English cases holding that an infant is
bound by his contracts if they are beneficial to him fall within the foregoing
principle. Holmes v. Blogg, 8 Taunt 5o8 (1&8). See Anson, Contracts
(14th ed, i919) i84.
In the principal case the court further extends the "beneficial" view by
holding that it is unnecessary to find a benefit to the infant if a detriment on
the part of his vendor is shown, making it necessary to prove a total failure
of consideration before the infant may recover. In so holding the court
practically overruled a similar English case, Hamilton v. Vaughan-Sherrin
E. E. Co. supra. The Minnesota rule seems to be a flexible one which will
prevent imposition upon the infant and also tend to prevent the infant from
imposing to any serious degree upon others. It is submitted that the instant
case goes too far. If sustained it will virtually destroy any possibility of
restitution by an infant after rescission of contract, since some "forbearance"
or "giving up of a legal right" can usually be shown by the other party.
See 28 L R. A. (N. S.) 128 (note); Williston, Contracts (1920) 459.

MUN'ICIPAL CORPORTION-RECITALS

IN

BONDS-ESTOPPat.

TO

DENY.-Ac-

tion on a county's note for $5ooo which recited that it was to recover a
casual indebtedness and that it was for an amount within the constitutional
debt limit. Actually, the note alone was within the limit but it was one of
three the total of which was greater than was allowed. Attached to it, when
received by the plaintiff, was a statement that it was part of the loan for
the larger amount. It was claimed that the county was estopped to show the
note void by reason of the constitutional limit. Held (3dissents) : Judgment
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for defendant.

Bank of Moultrie v. Rockdale County, 119 S. E. 322 (Ga.,

1923).

In determining whether a' bond issue is in excess of the constitutional
limitations on indebtedness three facts must be known: (i) the percentage
of the taxable property up to which the constitution permits the corporation
to borrow, (2) the value of this taxable property, and (3) the amount of the
outstanding indebtedness. The first and second are 'matters of record to
which the creditor must look for his information and as to which he may
not rely on the recitals. Dixon County v. Field, iii U. S. 83 (1884). See
note in L R. A. 19x5 A, 916 et seq. If the face of the bond shows the issue
is greater than is allowed, the creditor has all the facts necessary and may
not rely on the recital at all; Corbet v. Rocksbury, 94 Minn. 397, io3 N. W.
Ix (i9oS); St. Lawrence Tp. v. Furman, 171 Fed. 4o0, 96 C. C. A. 356
(i9o9); Farmers' Loan and Trust Co. v. Wilcox County, 287 Fed. 8o9
(1923) ; likewise, if the bond itself is within the limit but public records show
that the previous indebtedness taken with it is in excess of the limit. Sutliff
v. Lake County Commissioner, 47 U. S. 230 (1892); National Life Ins. Co.
v. Mead, z3 S. D. 37, 82 N. W. 78 (igoo).
But where the indebtedness is not a matter of record and the" note itself
is not beyond the allowance, the purchaser has no way of learning of the
invalidity of the bond. In such a case the recital on the bond is treated as
a statement by the officers most concerned that the previous indebtedness and
the present loan do not exceed the limit, and the corporation is thereafter
estopped to deny it. Gunnison County v. Rollins, 173 U. S. 255 "(1898);
Waite v. Santa Cruz, 184 U. S. 3o2 (1902); City of Laredo v. Frishmuth,
196 S. W. 199 (TeX., 1917).
In the present case the note does not mention the total issue and its own
amount is not in excess of the limit. Therefore, it seems that, unless the
county showed that the plaintiff had notice of the total amount of the new
indebtedness, he could rely on the recital and the county could not deny
the facts represented therein.
PARTNERSHIP-LABILITY FOR WILFUL AND M-ALIcIOUS Acrs.-Two part-

ners were engaged in a business on rented premises, and one of them, while
attempting to remove some lumber from the premises in the absence of the
other, committed a wilful and malicious assault on the landlord. The latter
sued both partners jointly for injuries sustained. Held: Nonsuit imposed,
because the absent partner was not liable. Polis v. HeLnan, 276 Pa. 315, 12o
AU. 269 (1923).
Section 13 of the Uniform Partnership Act provides: "Where by any
wrongful act or omission of any partner acting in the ordinary course of
the business of the partnershipi, or with the authority of his co-partner, loss
or injury is caused to any person, not being a partner in the partnership,
the partnership is liable therefor to the same extent as the partner so acting
or omitting to act." In all the cases dealing with the liability of the partnership for a partner's wrongful acts, the courts begin with the statement of
the fundamental rule of law that such liability is based on the theory of
agency. As a result, they merely apply to the relation of partnership the
general law of agency. McIntyre v. Kavanaugh, 242 U. S. 138 (igi6).
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In the modern cases, the test which governs the liability of the principal
for the wilful and malicious acts of his agent, is whether the agent was
acting within the course of his employment in the doing of these acts.
Mechem, Agency (2d ed.), vol. 2, 1520; Aiken v. Holyoke Ry. Co., 184
Mass. 269, 68 N. E. 238 (i9o3). But, based on this statement of the law,
courts in the various jurisdictions arrive at widely different conclusions in
their application of it. Rounds v. Delaware R. R. Co., 64 N. Y. 129 (1876);
Magar v. Hammond, 183 N. Y. 387, 76 N. E. 474 (i9o6).
The expressions, "in the ordinary course of the business of the partnership" as used in the Act, and "in the course of employment," are similarly
construed. For example, those courts which tend toward making. the principal liable for the acts of his agent if they can reasonably do so, would
take the same attitude in determining the liability of a partnership. If, as
in the principal case, the acting partner disregards his service to the partnership and commits wilful and malicious acts to accomplish some purpose
of his own, it is settled that the partnership would not be liable. Gilbert v.
Emmons, 42 Ill. 143 (1866); Woodling v. Knickerbocker, 31 Minn. 268, 178
N. W. 387 (1883). Whereas, if the partner is acting for the interest of
all, or with authority, as in bringing suits in the partnership name, such circumstances generally establish the liability of the partnership. See Rosenkrans v. Barker, 115 Ill. 3 3 i, 3 N. E. 93 (1885); Page v. Citizens' Banking
Co. ct al, ini Ga. 73, 36 S. E. 418 (igoo); McIntyre v. Kavanaugh, supra.
Although the principal case is apparently the first case decided on this
point in Pennsylvania since the adoption of the Uniform Partnership Act,
the court did not note any change in the law due to its provisions. There
is no reason to believe that other courts will hold otherwise, since Section 13
of the Act is a mere restatement of the common law.

PROPFRTY-CoNTINGENT REMAINDERs-ALIENATION.-The testator in his
will provided that A shall hold certain property during the term of her
life and at her death it shall descend equally to the heirs of her body in fee
simple. The plaintiff claimed an interest in the land through a conveyance
from A's son, which was made prior to A's death; A had three children,
two of whom, including the plaintiff's grantor, died in A's lifetime. The
plaintiff instituted a suit to quiet title against the heirs of the child who
survived A. Held: Judgment for defendants. Kendrick V. Scott, 254 S. W.
422 (Ill

1g23).

In the principal case the court decided that the remainder after the
life estate to the "heirs of the body" created only a contingent remainder,
whereas a devise over to the "children" would have given them a vested
remainder. Because the law favors the vesting of estates, the inference is
generally drawn that vested rather than contingent remainders were intended, especially where the limitations in the will are to the direct descendants of the testator. 'Woodard v. Wyoodard, 184 Iowa 1178, 169 N. W. 464
(x918); Mallaney v. Monahan, 232 Mass. 279, 122 N. E. 387 (1918). This
tendency.often leads courts to give the word "heirs" the meaning and legal
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significance of the word "children." In such a case, the "children" of the life
tenant who are living at the testator's death take a vested remainder in fee,
subject to the letting in of after-born children, their enjoyment of the fee
simple being postponed until the death of the life tenant. Levin v. Bell,
285 11. 22Y, 12o N. E. 633 (1918) ; Albright v. Voorhiis, io4 AUt. 27 (N. J.,
1918); Burkley v. Burkley, 2-6 Pa. 338, io9 Atl. 687 (1920).
Although in some instances the courts disregard the real intention of the
testator in determining the -quantity of the estate devised, nevertheless, when
it is ascertained that a remainder exists, the courts are guided by the apparent
intention of the testator in deciding whether the remainder is vested or
contingent. So, when the evident purpose of the testator is to give to the
word "heirs" its strict legal meaning, the courts hold that the remaindermen have only a contingent interest. This is true, since there are no heirs
until the death of the life tenant. Putnam v. Gleason, 99 Mass. 454 (1868);
Rutherford v. Rutherford, 116 Tenn. 383, 92 S. W. 1112 (igo6); Merserean
v. Katz T97 App. Div. 895, i8g N. Y. S. 847 (1921). Hence, a deed executed
by such a contingent remainderman before the death of the life tenant conveys
nothing. Robeson v, Cochran, 255 Ill,
355, 99 N. E. 649 (i912).
The superadded words create a fresh limitation and the heirs of the
body take by way of purchase and not limitation. Since the heirs of the
body are made a "new and independent stream of descents," the conclusion
of the court is apparently in agreement with the few decisions on these
issues. See McCrea v. McCrea, 5 Ohio App. 35! 1(1915).

